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too far? The standard commonly accepted, and referred to in the
Posluns judgment," is that the tribunal will be disqualified "if a
real-likelihood of bias is shown", presumably beyond the bias of
"the voluntary association of the members".86 It is a tricky ques-
tion, but one which appears in the first instance to be a question of
fact : is there, in the circumstances, a real probability ofbias? Again,
circumstances will affect results.
(7) The judgment reviews the authorities relating to the ques-
tion whether the tribunal that has offended its rules or those of
natural justice can purge itself of its error by holding a second
hearing. Thecourt prescribes forthe second proceeding the standard
of a bona fide intent to do that which is right. Thejudgment asserts
that a tribunal can purge itself without formally annulling the first
order. However, it is submitted that failure to annul may be evid-
ence contributing to a conclusion that the tribunal was in fact still
under the influence of its former decision. Once again the legal
standard calls for a conclusion of fact that is bound to fluctuate
with the circumstances of the case.
A. W. R. CAi~noTHEps*
LABouR LAw-PICKETING ON SHOPPING CENTREs.-The ancient
market place was more than a private commercial complex: it was
the hub of social intercourse and the forum for public debate and
controversy. The modern shopping centre, seeking to emulate the
commercial and social functions of the market place, has become
as well the reluctant host of controversy.
Picketing by labour unions on shopping centre premises has
recently been reviewed in three cases in the courts of British Col-
umbia and Saskatchewan .' These cases throw into bold relief both
the conflict between the public and private functions of the shop-
ping centre and the difficulty of forcing public law pegs into private
law pigeonholes.
The conflict between the public and private functions of the
shopping centre stems from the fact that private ownership of side-
81 Supra, footnote 1, at p . 329.
16 Ibid., at p . 330 .
*A. W. R . Carrothers, Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Western
Ontario, London, Ontario .
I Zeller's (Western) Ltd. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1518 (1962),
36 D.L.R . (2d) 581 (B.C.C.A.), Zeller's (Western) Ltd. v. Retail Clerks
Union, Local 1518 (1963), 42 D.L.R . (2d) 583 (B.C.C.A.) ; Grosvenor Park
Shopping Centre Ltd. v. Cave (1963), 40 D
.
L.R. (2d) 1006 (Sask . Q.B .) ;
rev'd. (1964), 49 W.W.R . 237 (Sask. C.A.).
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walks, driveways, parking lots, and other areas is retained by the
shopping centre operator, subject to the right of merchants to have
access for themselves, their employees, their customers and their
suppliers to the leased premises . Yet the success of the shopping
centre for both operator and merchant, depends on the presence
of the public in these very areas. When members of the community
grow accustomed to coming to the shopping centre for their rec-
reation, for social contact or to patronize a particular store, they
are more likely to patronize all of the stores in the complex. Thus
no attempt is made to ensure that persons entering the centre are
prospective patrons of a particular merchant ; rather
all
are wel-
come whether they come to shop or to stroll .
When a labour dispute arises between a merchant and his em-
ployees, it is natural that they will wish to picket near the locus of
the dispute, their employer's business premises . There they can
reach fellow-emPloyees, customers and suppliers, and appeal for
sympathy and support. Traditionally, this type of industrial war-
fare takes place on public sidewalks and streets, but in the shopping
centre such areas are privately owned. May the pickets, then, reach
the public where the public congregates, despite their intrusion on
the private property interests of the operator and the merchant?
The recent cases give an affirmative answer.
The Zeller's litigation' arose from the suit of a tenant to enjoin
all picketing by his striking employees on a sidewalk in front of
his store, on the ground that such picketing constituted illegal
interference with his easement. The court of first instance granted
an injunction against all picketing, but expressly refrained from
enjoining conduct permitted by the British Columbia Trade-unions
Act.$ That Act allows picketing during the course of a legal strike,
and "without acts that are otherwise unlawful". The union argued
that shopping centre picketing, otherwise unobjectionable, was
within the protection of the statute. With this contention the ap-
Dellate court disagreed. Tysoe J.A . held :
The difficulty in the way of this objection of the appellant is that sub-
stantial interruption of passage along a right-of-way is an unlawful
act. The appellant has no more right to enter upon the lands over which
the respondent has easement rights and to so interfere with those rights
as to injure the respondent than it has to enter upon lands without the
consent of the owner of those lands. The very purpose of picketing in
the passageway and on any of the several lands over which the respon-
dent has easement rights must be to hinder and deter employees of the
respondent and its customers and prospective customers and other




persons who may have business with it from going to and from the
respondent's store premises by the means available to therni namely,
by using the passageway . As I have earlier said this constitutes, in my
opinion, an unlawful interference with the easement rights . I cannot
conceive that any picketing of the nature which I suspect the appellant
desires to engage in would not constitute such an unlawful interference .
If, however, it would not, the restraining order does not stand in the
appellant's way.4
On the narrow ground that "a right of action in respect of ob-
struction of an easement . . . will only He where the entry amounts
to an obstruction causing injury to the plaintiff",' Wilson J.A .
dissented . As he noted :
. . . if we are to support that part of the injunction which prohibits any
picketing on the area covered by the easement, we must surmise that
legal picketing there will cause injury or damage. This may well be
true, but we are not, I think, entitled to act on this sort of propheCy. 6
Apparently determined to test the point, the union continued
to picket on the sidewalk. The tenant moved to have the pickets
committed for contempt of the injunction, and the trial judge made
a finding that there had been a violation of the order forbidding
picketing ". . . upon the lands and premises . . . over which . . . the
plaintiff has an easement . . . or from doing any act amounting to
a nuisance". From this finding, the union appealed.
Davey J.A., speaking for aunanimous CoUrt,7 set aside the con-
viction for contempt. Citing Williams v. Aristocratic Restaurants8
as authority for the proposition that peaceful picketing does not,
per se, constitute a nuisance, he refused to vindicate the private
property interests of the plaintiff.
I have difficulty in understanding how, on the material before us, con
duct that would have been lawful upon a public sidewalk and so within
the saving clause of the injunction became unlawful and in breach of
the injunction because it occurred on a private sidewalk over which
the respondent had an easement appurtenant to the store that was
being picketed. I can see no essential difference between a public road
and respondent's private easement that could produce that change in
legal result . 9
That the case depended on recognition of the public character
of a shopping centre, despite private ownership, is evidenced by an
obiter dictum to the effect that the pickets were stationed in an area
4 (1962), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 581, at p . 584 (Sheppard, J.A . concurring) .
5 Ibid., at p . 585 . 6 Ibid., at p . 586.
7 (1963), 42 D.L.R. (2d) 593 . The court included Sheppard J.A ., who
had concurred in the majority decision of Tysoe J.A . in the original litiga-
tion .
8 [19511 S.C.R . 762 .
1 (1963), 42 D.L.R. (2d) 583, at pp . 585-596 .
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"to which the public are invited" and that there was no evidence
that the pickets "were exceeding the terms of the invitation to use
the sidewalk held out to the public by the owner ofthe fee"."
The court's holding in the contempt proceeding, in effect, thus
reversed the holding on the original injunction application by per-
mitting picketing where it had formerly been forbidden. However,
Davey J.A . did leave open the legality of the picketing when viewed
as trespass in the context of an action by the shopping centre owner.
Such an action, of course, would present squarely for decision the
choice between the public and private character of a shopping
centre.
This very issue arose in the Saskatchewan courts in Grosvenor
Park Shopping Centre v. Cave." Here a shopping centre owner
sued to restrain picketing by a tenant's striking employees on the
parking area and sidewalks. In answer to the owner's complaint
of trespass, the union pleaded that the parking area and sidewalks
should be treated as "quasi-public in nature" and as having "lost
their identity as private property" . 12 Rejecting an American case
cited in support of this legally difficult proposition, Bence C.J.Q.B .
held :
I am of the opinion that in this Province there is no such thing as quasi-
public property . It is either public or private, and in this instance it is
indisputably private . The plaintiff has the right to refuse access by
persons to any property owned by it over which it has retained control .
This would be all of the unleased portion of the shopping centre . 13
Accordingly, an injunction was granted against trespass upon the
plaintiff's land .
At this juncture, the first Zeller's case had decided that shop-
ping centre picketing was enjoinable at the suit of the tenant ; the
second Zeller's decision had not yet reversed this position . The trial
decision in Grosvenor Park thus merely extended to the owner the
right possessed by his tenant to have shopping centre picketing
enjoined . However, with the second Zeller's decision, the anom-
alous situation arose that such picketing was either permitted or
forbidden, depending on the identity of the plaintiff- permitted at
the suit of the tenant, forbidden at the suit of the owner.
On appeal, the anomaly was erased. In a rather surprising
judgment, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that the owner
could not maintain an action in trespass." Culliton C.J.S . held :
The area upon which it is alleged the appellants have trespassed is part
11 Ibid., at p . 586 . Supra, footnote 1 .
12 Ibid., at pp . 1008-1009 . ]hid,, at pp. 1009-1010.




of what is well known as a shopping centre . While legal title to the area
is in the respondent, it admits in its pleadings that it has granted ease-
ments to the many tenants. The evidence also establishes that the
respondent has extended an unrestricted invitation to the public to
enter upon the premises . The very nature of the operation is one in
which the respondent, both in its own interests and in the interests of
its tenants, could not do otherwise . Under these circumstances it can-
not be said that the respondent is in actual possession . The most that
can be said is that the respondent exercises control over the premises
but does not exercise that control to the exclusion of other persons.
For that reason, therefore, the respondent cannot maintain an action
in trespass against the appellants."
Whereas Davey J.A. in the second Zeller's case had indicated
that an action might be framed not in nuisance but in trespass,
Culliton C.J.S . suggested, obiter dictum, that the proper remedy
was not trespass but nuisance. But the combined effect of the
second Zeller's case and Grosvenor Park is that peaceful picketing
during a lawful strike on the public areas of a shopping centre is
enjoinable by neither landlord nor tenant . Implicit, indeed explicit,
in this result is a recognition of the public nature of the shopping
centre . Disputes, controversies, public appeals, may be conducted
there as well as commerce . The market place of wares has become
again the market place of ideas.
Yet neither those who applaud nor those who decry the results
of these two cases can be entirely happy with the technique of
analysis that produced them . In the second Zeller's case, the langu
age of the court was that of "invitation to the public . . . by the
owner of the foe" ; 11 in Grosvenor Park the court found that the
owner "did not have that degree of possession essential to an action
in trespass" .17 With respect, the attempt to shackle the analysis of
labour relations problems with the ancient bonds of real property
law is inappropriate -whatever the results of the cases . Much to
be preferred is the approach of the Supreme Court of California
in Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp . v . Bakery Workers' Union
Local No. 31 . 11 The facts of this case were almost identical with
those of Grosvenor Park : a suit by the owner of a shopping centre
to enjoin otherwise lawful, peaceful, picketing of a tenant's prem-
ises . Tobriner J., for a unanimous court, declined to grant the
injunction :
We conclude that the picketing in the present case cannot be adjudged
in the terms of absolute property rights ; it must be considered as part
of the law of labor relations, and a balance cast between the opposing
11 Ibid., at p . 242 . 16 (1963), 42 D.L.P, . (2d) 583, at p . 586 .
17 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 242 . 3. 8 (1964), 394 P . 2d 921 .
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interests of the union and the lessor ofthe shopping center. The prohibi-
tion of the picketing would in substance deprive the union of the op-
portunity to conduct its picketing at the most effective point of per-
suasion ; the place of the involved business . The interest of the union
thus rests upon the solid substance of public policy and constitutional
right ; the interest of the plaintiff lies in the shadow cast by a property
right worn thin by public usage. 19
There remains, then, the task of weighing up the competing
interests of the labour union and the picketed tenant or landowner
in the special context of shopping centre picketing. In the ordinary
industrial dispute, ofcourse, public policy acknowledges the union's
interest in peacefully advertising the existence of a labour dispute
through picketing. Such picketing is lawful even though it inter-
feres with the use and enjoyment of the picketed property . To this
extent, shopping centre picketing presents no special problem.
Likewise, minor, casual, impediments to pedestrian and vehicular
traffic may accompany both ordinary and shopping centre picket-
ing, and are not wrongful where they are not deliberate. Even the
risk of accidentally (but not purposely) causing inconvenience to
adjacent shopowners is common to both situations, and can be
handled by requiring the pickets to confine their activities to the
immediate vicinity of the dispute.
The special factor in shopping centre picketing is the landlord,
a neutral in the labour dispute. First, he is responsible for the main-
tenance of orderly traffic movement in the public areas of the shop-
ping centre . Whereas the expenditure of tax funds on public roads
and sidewalks may justify a little interference with traffic flow to
serve the greater public good of publicizing labour controversies,
no such justification exists in the shopping centre . The landlord
spends his own money on the public areas of the shopping centre,
and does so for the sole purpose of making a profit . Second, while
public authorities may, on behalf of the community, strike a reason-
able balance between traffic and picketing on public sidewalks and
streets, the shopping centre owner can hardly be expected to make
such a choice : he has no authority to speak for the community ;
to grant picketing or parading privileges to all would invite chaos,
while to do so selectively would invite commercial reprisals. He is
thus driven to adopt a highly restrictive approach to granting per-
mission to groups who wish to parade or picket in the shopping
centre .
Set against these two legitimate concerns of the landlord is the
union's contention that unless picketing is allowed on the public




areas of the shopping centre, it cannot take place at all . The theo-
retical alternative, of course, is picketing on the adjacent public
highways . To such picketing there are both legal and practical
obstacles. Legally, the risk is that picketing on the perimeter of the
shopping centre will be construed as illegal pressure against all of
its tenants, no matter how explicit the picket signS.20 Practically,
the difficulty is that many more pickets are required to patrol the
perimeter of the entire shopping centre than the immediate vicinity
of the tenanf s store .
Weighing these considerations in the scales of public policy,
it is hard to say that peaceful informational picketing should be
forbidden in shopping centres . The flow of traffic may be protected
by requiring that the pickets remain few in number, wen-behaved,
and in a confined area ; both the landlord.and the union are better
served by the legal rationale adopted in California, which does not
depend on the owner's permission or invitation to picket ; the union
is not exposed to the legal and practical disadvantages of perimeter
picketing. Happily the appellate courts of Saskatchewan and
British Columbia appear to have struck this balance, whether
consciously or otherwise.
H. W. ARTHURS*
CONFLICT OF LAws -STATUS- CAPACITY TO MARRY-REcOG-
NiTioN OF PRIOR FOREIGN DIVORCE -THE INCIDENTAL QUESTION.
-The deceptively simple fact pattern in the recent case of Sch-
webel v. Ungar I provided the Supreme'Court of Canada with an
opportunity to review a number of problems'in conflict of laws .
In the judgment appealed from, the Ontario Court of Appeal had
had occasion to discuss the conflicts principles relating to domi-
cile, status, recognition of foreign divorces, and capacity to marry.
Moreover, the unique sequence of events which gave rise to the
litigation constituted a textbook example of 'another problem
which has occasioned a measure of debate in academic circles but
which has been left virtually untouched by judicial decision in ther
20 Blue Star Lines v . L W.A . (1959), 29 W.W.R . 337 (B.C.S.C.) ; Pacific
Coast Terminals v. LL.A . (1959), 29 W.W.R . 410 (B.C.C.A .) . See also,
Hersees of Woodstock v. Goldstein, [196312 O.R. 81 (C.A.), (visual impact
of picketing directed at goods of struck manufacturer found to extend to
all goods of picketed neutral retailer ; picketing held unlawful)~
*H. W. Arthurs, of Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto .
1 (19631 1 O.R . 429, 37 D.L.R. (2d) 467, (Ont. H.C.) ; [1964] 1 O.R .
430, 42 D.L.R. (2d) 622 (Ont . C.A.), aff'd (1965), 48 D.L.R . (2d) 644
(S.C
.
C .) .
